One chance from the summit.

Sabella after 2011

Argentina hosted the 2011 Copa América and went out in the quarter-final, drawing 1–1 with Uruguay before losing 5–4 on penalties. The tournament had been intended as a demonstration of the squad’s maturity in front of a home audience. Sergio Batista left the position shortly afterwards.

Alejandro Sabella was appointed in July 2011. He arrived with a coaching record built almost entirely at Estudiantes de La Plata, where he had won the 2009 Copa Libertadores, the club’s first continental title since 1970, and reached the FIFA Club World Cup final later that year. His teams were organized rather than expansive, built on defined roles and defensive structure, and he had a reputation for detailed preparation rather than public argument.

Two decisions shaped the four years that followed. The first was giving Messi the captaincy permanently. Argentina had rotated the armband under previous coaches; Sabella settled it, and in doing so settled the hierarchy of the squad around its best player. The second was a tactical judgement that ran through the whole cycle: the national team could not reproduce Barcelona’s structure, because it did not have Barcelona’s midfield, and any attempt to do so would leave large distances behind the forward line.

Sabella’s answer was to organize the team so that Messi received the ball in advanced central areas without the side being open when possession was lost. That meant accepting less collective possession than Barcelona took for granted, using Javier Mascherano as a permanent screen, and asking the players around the attackers to cover ground the attackers would not cover. It is a mistake to describe this as defensive football by preference. Argentina scored 35 goals in qualification. The structure was a response to the specific squad available.

First in South America

Argentina won the South American qualifying group. The final record was 16 matches, 9 wins, 5 draws and 2 defeats, 35 goals scored and 15 conceded, 32 points, two clear of Colombia in second place. Brazil did not take part, having qualified automatically as host, and each team took a bye on the matchday it would otherwise have played the hosts.

The qualifying side had a recognizable shape. Fernando Gago provided the progressive passing from deep. Mascherano took the defensive responsibility in front of the back four and covered laterally when the full-backs advanced. Di María started from midfield and arrived in the final third at speed. Messi dropped away from the centre-backs to receive between the lines, then attacked the space he had created. Higuaín occupied the central defenders and ran the channels behind them. Agüero attacked the inside spaces on either side of the striker.

Argentina was at its most effective in transition, when opponents had committed players forward and the distance between Messi and the opposing goal was shortest. The record was not overwhelming. Five draws in sixteen matches is a first-place campaign built on consistency rather than domination, and two defeats in a nine-team group with no Brazil is a real margin of error. What qualification established was that the attacking group functioned together, and that Argentina could win a long campaign without playing well every week.

The figure of ten qualifying goals for Messi in this campaign is widely cited but was not confirmed against an authoritative per-player qualifying table during the preparation of this chapter. RSSSF and the CONMEBOL qualifying summary give the campaign’s leading scorer as Luis Suárez of Uruguay with eleven, without listing Messi’s total. The claim is recorded here as unverified rather than stated as fact.

The four attackers

The Argentine press called them the Cuatro Fantásticos. The English-language coverage generally used the Fab Four. The label covered Messi, Agüero, Higuaín and Di María, and it described a selection principle rather than a formation. Sabella did not field all four in a fixed shape across the tournament, and the group as a unit started only a portion of Argentina’s matches.

Messi was captain and the team’s central creator. He received between the lines, dropped into midfield when Argentina needed a passer, carried the ball through pressure, and scored. Almost every attacking sequence of consequence involved him.

Agüero worked the inside channels and combined with Messi in short exchanges around the penalty area. He operated as a second striker rather than a wide forward, which added a body to the central attack and removed one from the defensive line ahead of the midfield. Higuaín played centrally, occupied both centre-backs, and made repeated runs in behind. The runs mattered even when the ball did not follow them, because they pushed the defensive line backwards and opened the area in which Messi preferred to receive.

Di María was listed as a midfielder and functioned as a fourth attacker in transition. He carried the ball long distances, arrived late in the box, and was expected to recover defensively on the left. That last duty was the one most often compromised when Argentina attacked with all four.

The structural cost was straightforward. With four attacking players committed ahead of the ball, Mascherano, Gago and the back four had to defend a large area between them when possession turned over. Against opponents who defended deep and did not counterattack, the arrangement was manageable. Against opponents who broke quickly, it exposed the space in front of and beside the centre-backs.

Twenty-three without Tevez

Carlos Tevez had scored 19 Serie A goals for Juventus in 2013–14 and won the title. He was not in Argentina’s 30-man preliminary squad, announced in May 2014. Sabella had not selected him at any point since taking the job in 2011. Esteban Cambiasso was also absent from the preliminary list.

The established forward group was retained. Ezequiel Lavezzi and Rodrigo Palacio were the reserve attackers, both of whom had been used through qualification. Martín Demichelis returned to the squad after roughly two years away from the national team.

The final 23 was confirmed on 2 June. Éver Banega, Nicolás Otamendi and José Sosa were the three players cut from the preliminary group. Gago was selected despite persistent fitness concerns. Sergio Romero remained the first-choice goalkeeper despite a season of very limited club football at Monaco.

The Tevez omission generated sustained argument in Argentina then and afterwards. What is established is the sequence above: an excellent club season, no international selection under Sabella in three years, and no place in the preliminary squad. Claims that Messi demanded his exclusion, or that a confirmed personal feud determined the decision, are not established by authoritative evidence.

Balance behind the forwards

Argentina’s intended starting arrangement was a 4–3–3: Romero; Pablo Zabaleta, Federico Fernández, Ezequiel Garay, Marcos Rojo; Gago, Mascherano, Di María; Agüero, Messi, Higuaín.

Romero started all seven matches and kept four clean sheets. He had played almost no competitive football for Monaco during the preceding season, which made his selection a point of criticism before the tournament. He made important saves against Iran and Switzerland and saved two penalties in the semi-final shootout. Zabaleta played every match at right-back, advancing selectively rather than continuously. Garay started all seven and was the organizing presence in central defence.

Federico Fernández and Martín Demichelis split the other central position. Fernández started the first four matches. Demichelis started the last three, beginning with the quarter-final against Belgium. The change coincided with Argentina defending deeper and in a more compact block, and it should be read as a tactical adjustment to that approach rather than a judgement on Fernández, who had been part of a defence that conceded three goals in the group stage and none in the round of 16.

Rojo started six matches and ran forward directly from left-back, adding width when Argentina attacked. He was suspended for the quarter-final after a second caution against Switzerland, and José María Basanta replaced him against Belgium. Rojo returned for the semi-final.

Mascherano became progressively more central to the team. He protected the space in front of the centre-backs, organized the defensive line, covered for advancing full-backs, and made recovery runs. His importance grew as Argentina’s attacking output fell. Gago and Lucas Biglia competed for the passing position in midfield. Gago appeared in six matches and gave Argentina its most direct route from defence into the attacking third. Biglia appeared in all seven and became a starter from the quarter-final onwards, tightening Argentina’s central positioning at the cost of some progressive passing.

Di María started five matches on the left of midfield and scored the goal that beat Switzerland before injuring his right thigh against Belgium. Messi started all seven, scored four goals, all in the group stage, and created Di María’s winner. Higuaín started six matches, scored against Belgium, and made the runs that created the space Messi used. Agüero started the first three matches, was injured against Nigeria, and returned only as a substitute in the semi-final and final. Lavezzi replaced him in the side and provided width and defensive running on the flank. Palacio appeared five times from the bench.

Seven matches

Group F

Argentina was drawn with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iran and Nigeria. It won all three matches, scored six goals and conceded three, and finished first with nine points. Messi scored in every group match.

Bosnia and Herzegovina: the halftime correction

Argentina opened on 15 June at the Maracanã against a Bosnia side playing its first World Cup match. Sabella started in a 5–3–2, with Hugo Campagnaro joining Fernández and Garay in a back three, Zabaleta and Rojo as wing-backs, Maxi Rodríguez in midfield and Higuaín on the bench.

The scoring took three minutes. Messi’s free kick was worked into the area and Sead Kolašinac turned it into his own net. The lead did not settle Argentina. The three-man midfield struggled to move the ball forward, Messi received it a long way from goal, and Bosnia found room between the lines through Miralem Pjanić and Zvjezdan Misimović.

Sabella changed the shape at halftime, and the change decided the match. Gago replaced Campagnaro and Higuaín replaced Maxi Rodríguez. Argentina reverted to a back four and a 4–3–3. Messi began to receive higher and closer to Higuaín. In the 65th minute he exchanged passes with Higuaín on the edge of the area, went past a defender and finished off the far post. Vedad Ibišević scored for Bosnia in the 84th minute after a defensive error, and Argentina held on for 2–1.

The most instructive element was that Sabella had abandoned his own starting plan inside forty-five minutes and did not return to it.

Iran: one opening in added time

Argentina met Iran on 21 June at the Mineirão in Belo Horizonte, returning to the 4–3–3 that had rescued the opening match. Carlos Queiroz’s Iran defended in a compact 4–5–1, kept its lines close, and denied Argentina the central space in which Messi worked.

The match was the clearest demonstration of what a disciplined low block could do to Sabella’s side. Argentina had the ball for long periods and could not use it. Messi was picked up early whenever he dropped, and when he received in wider areas the distance to goal was too great. Iran was not passive. It counterattacked with intent, and Reza Ghouchannejhad and Ashkan Dejagah created openings. Romero made two important saves. Iran also had a strong appeal for a penalty when Zabaleta challenged Dejagah in the area, which the referee waved away and which remained disputed afterwards.

The goal came in the first minute of added time. Messi received on the right side outside the penalty area, moved the ball onto his left foot and curled it inside the far post. Argentina won 1–0 and qualified for the knockout stage with a match to spare.

Nigeria: five goals and the first injury

Argentina and Nigeria met on 25 June at the Beira-Rio in Porto Alegre with both sides already assured of progress. The match produced five goals in the tournament’s most open Argentine performance, and it cost Sabella one of his four attackers.

Messi scored in the third minute, following up after a shot was not held. Ahmed Musa equalized within sixty seconds, running through the centre of Argentina’s defence. In first-half added time Messi scored again from a free kick, struck low and around the wall. Musa levelled once more two minutes after the interval, exposing the same central corridor. Marcos Rojo settled it in the 50th minute, turning in a corner off his upper leg at the near post.

Agüero left the field in the 38th minute with a muscular injury and was replaced by Lavezzi. He did not start again in the tournament. Messi was withdrawn after 63 minutes with the match won. Argentina finished first in the group; Nigeria also advanced. The result was a 3–2 group-stage victory, and Argentina’s two conceded goals came from the same weakness the qualifying structure had always carried, which was the space available to a quick forward running at a defence that had committed players upfield.

Contemporary reporting differs on the exact point of contact for Rojo’s goal. It is recorded here as coming off his upper leg or thigh. Descriptions calling it a knee goal are not supported by a stronger primary source.

The tournament narrows

The change in Argentina’s football between the group stage and the final was gradual and had several separate causes. It is worth setting them out in order, because the campaign is often described as though a single injury reshaped the team overnight.

Agüero’s injury against Nigeria removed one of the four attackers and brought in Lavezzi, a forward who defended his flank and held width rather than drifting inside. That alone changed the shape of Argentina’s attacking line and gave Messi a clearer position behind Higuaín.

Against Belgium, Sabella made three further changes to the side that had started the round of 16. Biglia replaced Gago, Demichelis replaced Fernández, and Basanta replaced the suspended Rojo. The effect was a shorter team: less distance between the lines, more bodies close to the penalty area, and less ambition in the first pass out of defence. Di María’s thigh injury in that same quarter-final removed the last of the transition runners. Enzo Pérez replaced him and started the semi-final and the final.

What resulted was measurable. Argentina kept clean sheets in the first three knockout matches. It also scored two goals in four knockout matches, one from Di María and one from Higuaín, and none after 5 July. Fewer players were consistently ahead of the ball. There was less central combination around Messi, who was now more often the only attacking outlet. There was less space around Mascherano, which made his defensive work more effective. The penalty area was better protected than at any point in the campaign.

Argentina did not stop attacking. It created clear chances in every knockout match, including the final. It attacked with fewer players and less frequently, and it depended on Messi to produce something from a smaller number of possessions.

Switzerland: the 118th minute

Argentina played Switzerland on 1 July at the Arena Corinthians in São Paulo. Agüero was unavailable, Lavezzi started, and the side functioned as a 4–2–3–1 with Messi behind Higuaín. Switzerland defended the central areas and gave Argentina little through the middle. The clearest first-half chance fell to Josip Drmić, who was released behind the defence and denied by Romero.

The goal came in the 118th minute. Messi collected possession in the centre circle and carried it directly at the Swiss defence. Three defenders moved toward him, which was the point of the run, and he released Di María into the space they had left. Di María finished past Diego Benaglio. Switzerland almost equalized in the final moments, when Blerim Džemaili met a free kick and headed against the post, the rebound coming back to him and going wide.

Belgium: an early goal, then control

Argentina met Belgium on 5 July at the Estádio Nacional Mané Garrincha in Brasília. Sabella made his three changes, and the team lined up as a compact 4–4–2. The goal arrived in the eighth minute. Di María’s shot from the edge of the area was deflected into Higuaín’s path, and Higuaín struck it first time on the half-volley past Thibaut Courtois. Higuaín later hit the crossbar after being played in behind.

What followed was a controlled defensive performance. Mascherano and Biglia held the central areas and gave Belgium nothing between the lines. Messi played around Higuaín rather than through the middle. As Belgium’s central route closed, it turned increasingly to crosses, which brought the ball into the area where Garay and Demichelis were strongest. Di María injured his right thigh and was replaced by Enzo Pérez in the 33rd minute. Argentina reached its first World Cup semi-final since 1990.

The Netherlands: no space through 120 minutes

The semi-final was played on 9 July at the Arena Corinthians. Di María was unavailable, Rojo returned from suspension, and Enzo Pérez started with Lavezzi on the opposite flank. Biglia and Mascherano held central midfield. Louis van Gaal’s Netherlands set up in a 3–5–2 and assigned Nigel de Jong to track Messi.

Both teams prioritized the protection of central space, and both were reluctant to commit players into areas from which they could be countered. The result was a match with very few clear chances across 120 minutes. Higuaín had the best of them, arriving at the near post and unable to direct his effort on target. Arjen Robben produced the one opening that would have settled it, breaking into the penalty area in the closing moments of regulation, and Mascherano recovered across to block the shot with a sliding tackle at full stretch.

Romero decided the shootout. He saved Ron Vlaar’s opening penalty and then Wesley Sneijder’s third. Messi, Garay and Agüero scored, Robben and Dirk Kuyt replied, and Maxi Rodríguez converted the fourth Argentine kick to win it 4–2.

Mascherano’s recovery tackle on Robben is placed by some records in the 90th minute and by others in the 91st. It is described here as occurring in the closing moments of regulation.

The final: one finish in the 113th minute

The final was played at the Maracanã on 13 July. Germany had reached it by beating Brazil 7–1 in Belo Horizonte on 8 July. Argentina had played 120 minutes against the Netherlands on 9 July. Germany therefore had one additional day of recovery, having played a semi-final that finished inside ninety minutes while Argentina’s went to a shootout.

Di María remained unavailable. Germany made a late change of its own: Sami Khedira withdrew during the warmup and Christoph Kramer took his place in the starting eleven.

Argentina set up in a compact 4–4–2. Lavezzi and Enzo Pérez took the wide midfield positions and recovered into the block when Germany had the ball. Biglia and Mascherano held the centre. Messi and Higuaín stayed higher, and Argentina looked to attack the space beside Benedikt Höwedes, who was playing at left-back rather than in his usual central position. Lavezzi supplied the width and Messi drifted toward that channel.

The chances

Around the 21st minute Toni Kroos attempted a header back toward Manuel Neuer and misjudged it. Higuaín ran onto the loose ball with only the goalkeeper to beat, took it slightly wide as he approached, and pulled his shot across the face of goal and wide. Higuaín later had the ball in the net after Lavezzi crossed from the right, and was clearly offside when the ball was played; the assistant referee flagged correctly.

Argentina began the second half well. Biglia released Messi through the inside-left channel within two minutes of the restart. Messi entered the penalty area, opened his body and struck the ball across Neuer, and the shot went wide of the far post. In extra time Rodrigo Palacio, on for Higuaín, received a ball over the German defence around the 97th minute with Neuer advancing. His first touch with the chest ran further from him than he intended, and his attempted chip over the goalkeeper drifted wide.

Manuel Neuer left his goal to challenge for a dropping ball. He reached and punched the ball, then made heavy contact with Gonzalo Higuaín with his raised knee. Referee Nicola Rizzoli awarded Germany a free kick. The physical sequence and the decision are both established. Whether the collision should have produced a penalty to Argentina remains a matter of interpretation and was disputed at the time. RSSSF does not list Higuaín among the cautioned players.

Götze’s winner

In the 113th minute André Schürrle advanced on the German left and crossed toward the far side of the penalty area. Mario Götze, who had replaced Miroslav Klose in the 88th minute, controlled the ball on his chest and volleyed it left-footed across Romero and inside the far post. Germany won 1–0.

Germany had more sustained possession and a deeper squad, and it was able to introduce Götze and Schürrle as attacking substitutes of genuine quality. Argentina created the better first-half chances and defended its penalty area effectively for long periods. Germany converted one opportunity in extra time. Argentina did not convert any of its own.

The result does not support a single explanation. Fatigue was a real factor given the recovery schedule, and it does not account for chances missed in the 21st and 47th minutes when both teams were fresh. Di María’s absence removed Argentina’s most effective transition runner, and Argentina still created the openings that would have won the match. Higuaín missed a clear chance, and so did Messi and Palacio. Germany was the better team across the tournament and did not dominate this particular match.

Tournament record

Seven of Argentina’s eight goals were scored by Argentine players; the eighth was Kolašinac’s own goal in the opening match. The semi-final against the Netherlands is recorded as a draw in standard win-draw-loss statistics. The penalty shootout decided progression and does not alter the result of the match.

The twenty-three

Appearances include starts and substitute appearances. Every total in this table was reconciled against the seven match records reproduced above.

Golden Ball and aftermath

Messi received the adidas Golden Ball as the tournament’s best player. He had played seven matches and scored four goals, all of them in the group stage, and had created Di María’s winner against Switzerland. The award was contested at the time, given that Argentina scored twice in four knockout matches and Messi scored in none of them.

Sabella left the position after the tournament. Argentina reached the Copa América final in 2015 and again in 2016 and lost both on penalties, to Chile on each occasion. Messi announced his international retirement after the second defeat and reversed the decision shortly afterwards.

The victories of 2021 and 2022 have altered how 2014 is discussed. The Copa América won at the Maracanã and the World Cup won at Lusail turned what had looked like a closing sequence of failures into an interval within a longer arc, and the players who lost in 2014 are now more often described as the generation before the one that won.

That framing is retrospective and should not be allowed to do the interpretive work. In July 2014 Argentina reached a World Cup final by defending better than it attacked, and lost it in extra time having created and missed the clearer opportunities. The campaign is legible on its own terms: a squad selected for attacking talent that advanced by containment, a coach who twice changed his own plan mid-tournament and was right both times, a goalkeeper who justified a contested selection, and one finish in the 113th minute that decided the tournament.

Di María said in later interviews that Real Madrid sent a letter on the morning of the final advising against his participation because of his injury, that he destroyed it without opening it, and that he left the decision to Sabella. This is his retrospective testimony given years after the event. The club’s motive is not independently established, and there is no evidence that Sabella’s team selection was determined by the letter. Di María was an unused substitute in the final.